In this article I challenge the current view that Hume is a naturalist as well as a sceptic. I hold he is a peculiar kind of rationalist. I argue that his position is best viewed as a philosophical approach designed to accommodate the tendencies of human nature. This task is carried out by means of a second order reflection, which turns out to be based upon reason of a non demonstrative kind. It is brought into clear focus when the mind (...) discovers a conflict between two tendencies. In section one, I highlight this kind of conflict in Hume’s account of causal inference. In section two I unfold the conflict that can be found in his account of our belief in the continued and independent existence of objects. In section three I show how it is possible to reconcile our tendencies. I maintain that this reconciliation is effected by means of second order, reason-based arguments. In section four, I examine the status of Hume's scepticism in the light of the preceding account and conclude that his standpoint is not sceptical at all. (shrink)

In this paper I shall show that Kant's best anti-sceptical argument, found in the “Refutation of Idealism” — hereafter Refutation —, is not successful in debunking the sceptic. My strategy will be to argue that, although dependent upon transcendental idealism, the Refutation is inconsistent with it. In order to achieve this goal, I shall sketch, in section 1, the two main interpretations of Kant's idealism, namely, the ‘two world’ and the ‘two aspect’ theories. I shall maintain that the latter is (...) more in keeping with Kant's overall intentions in the Critique of Pure Reason. In section 2, I shall spell out the main points of the Refutation. In section 3, I shall argue that, in the context of the Refutation, the conception of the permanent as the pre-condition of any temporal sequence clashes with some of the main doctrines of transcendental idealism. Finally, in section 4, I shall follow some unsuccessful attempts to harmonise transcendental idealism with the Refutation. (shrink)